Professor Katharine Adeney is Director of the University of Nottingham Asia Research Institute, and joined the School in 2013, having previously held positions at Sheffield, Balliol College, Oxford, and the LSE. She is the editor of Asia Dialogue the online journal of the UoN Asia Research Institute, co-editor of the new Palgrave Series on the Politics of South Asia and was previously co-editor of Government and Opposition. She is a member of the REF2021 Sub Panel for Politics and International Relations.
Her principal research interests include elections and democracy in South Asia, especially India and Pakistan; ethnic conflict regulation and institutional design; the creation and maintenance of national identities; the politics of federal states, and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Her main writing includes ” FEDERALISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICT REGULATION IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN”.



In this book, the author Katharine Anedey discusses the comparative federal problems of India and Pakistan. In Chapter 1 She argued that many states in the developing world rejected federalism because of its reputation as a state- and nation-destroying institution. Although it is not the only method by which to manage diversity. She talks about the arrangements need not be comprehensive: they may be confined to distinct constitutional and policy sectors. In federations, powers are separated between the two levels of government.

Yet some powers may be concurrent, as in India and Pakistan. As in Germany, powers are strictly separated, but policymaking and implementation may also be separated. The center is responsible for the making of policy. She further talks that the theory of ethnic conflict argues that ethnic conflicts have to be managed institutionally. Therefore this study deploys the terminology of homogeneous rather than mono-ethnic.she said that its solution is to promote security through the creation of homogeneous provinces.

Earlier versions of these arguments were made in “Between Federalism and Separatism: India and Pakistan”. Another way to counter the argument about the danger of minority victimization is to assert that victimization is unlikely to happen in homogeneous units. As for mobilization to occur, a threat needs to be perceived. This, however, is not an entirely satisfactory answer, as identities are situational and while a unit may be nearly homogeneous in one criterion, it may be much less homogeneous in another.

In 1971, 79 percent of the Indian Punjab population’s mother tongue was Punjabi, but only 60 percent of them were Sikhs. In the same year, 67 percent of the inhabitants of Nagaland were recorded as Christian but the largest linguistic group was the only 14 percent of Nagaland’s population.
Chapter 2. From 1707 to 1857 the Mughals had lost most of their power and were ineffective rulers. She said that there were a number of ways that the British built on Mughal forms of government, but rejects the argument that there was a linear progression. Maps of the Mughal Empire radically differ in the extent of the areas they include and the areas under the suzerainty of the Mughal Empire even when they did not directly control them the major ones being the territories of Bijapur and Golkonda in the south.

However, Akbar built extensively upon the institutions of the Sher Shah. In turn, Sher Shah built extensively upon systems of government that preceded him but also introduced elements of the Persian government. Sher Shah only controlled northern India for five years, his contribution only “provided an administrative blueprint” at most. Sher Shah did not appoint a political governor of Bengal because of his fear that such a governor “would cast off his allegiance at the first available opportunity.” Sher Shah divided the province into districts, each one directly responsible to himself. “Like the Ottoman Empire, Mughal India was a plundered state. The army was where the taxes went and where the surplus revenue came from.

A subedar was an “army commander the man in general charge of provincial affairs”. In addition, Rasheeduddin Khan’s list of the “Subahs of the Mughals and the SocioCultural Regions they covered” demonstrates that in all regions other than the south of the empire, more than one sociocultural region was included within one subah, and sometimes as many as five. Kabul (in the northwest); Kashmir, Lahore, and Multan (in the north); Thatta (Sindh), Gujarat, and Ajmer (in the west); Delhi, Agra, Awadh, Allahabad, and Malwa (in the central region); Bihar, Bengal, and Orissa (in the east); Khandesh, Berar, Ahmadnagar (Bijapur), and Aurangabad (Daulatabad); and Golconda (Hyderabad) and Bidar (in the south).

They explain the continuity by the fact that “these nuclear regions clearly represent the major agricultural areas”. By the seventeenth century “people expressed a common identity by using the local languages”. A coordinated strategy of expansion did not exist. When groups are territorially concentrated, consociationalism enhances the benefits of federalism without the danger of alienating minority groups from the decision-making process. It is this danger that enhances the fear of separatism, precluding many statesmen from advancing it as an ethnic conflict regulation mechanism.

The first constitution with a federal division of sovereignty between the center and the provinces was in 1919. Mr. C. N. Muthuranga Mudaliar, head of the Reception Committee for the 1927 Madras Congress, maintained that “Federal Government will be peculiarly unsuitable to India with its revived sense of solidarity,” in his welcome address at the 42nd Session of the Indian National Congress (INC) at Madras 26 to 28 December 1927 (reproduced in Zaidi 1980.

Over the issue of the boycott and noncooperation with the British constitutional structures and over the issue of whether to accept dominion status or call for complete independence. In the 1915 Congress session had called for self-government “by the introduction of Provincial Autonomy”. The name of a faction within the Congress that sought to disrupt the 1919 Act by contesting elections, seeking to undermine the institutions from within rather than pursuing Gandhian noncooperation.

Pitambar Kaushik, an Indian historian, defends the Congress’s record on minority rights at the time of the Nehru Report. He completely misses the point when his argument with the statement that Congress has repeatedly asserted its faith in the democratic principles of majority rule and self-determination. Given that democracy does not offer any protection to minorities, “democratic principles of majority rule” are not problematic for minority rights, nor does a commitment to “democracy” confirm a commitment to minorities. However, the separate rural seats for Muslims in the Punjab led to the creation of the intercommunal Unionist Party Talbot 1982.

The leader of a faction of the Muslim League that broke away over the issue of boycotting the Simon Commission in 1928 his faction saw an advantage in co-operating with the British rather than the Congress. Other entities captured the vote in the Muslim-majority provinces, such as the Unionist Party in Punjab and Red Shirts in NWFP. On the grounds that this would bring an undemocratic force into a constitution that was supposed to be moving in a more democratic and inclusive direction.

The Lahore Resolution was prompted by Viceroy Lithlingow, who encouraged the League to come up with a statement on its aims in an attempt to “prove” that the Congress’s call for immediate independence and a constituent assembly was not representative of the whole of India


In chapter 3 of FEDERALISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICT REGULATION IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN, Nehru’s answer to a question at a press conference on July 10, 1946, that the Congress would enter the Constituent Assembly “completely unfettered by agreements and free to meet all situations as they arise”, is the subject of much debate amongst orthodox and revisionist historians. Nehru was not “demonstrating any wish to wreck the Plan”. However, as Nehru as Congress president, the only possible effect this statement could have had was to undermine the Cabinet Mission Plan (CMP).

The Congress’s acceptance of the provisions of the CMP was a major departure from their publicly stated positions in previous negotiations. In assessing the preferences of Muslims in Muslim-majority provinces it is important to note the differences in aims between rural landlords and the urban salariat. The landowners did not join the League until very late in the day, especially in Punjab. It is significant that he did not demand the provincial allocation of residual power in 1927.

It is also noteworthy that the 1927 Congress Madras Session had accepted the demand for majority reservations in the Punjab and the Bengal. Although, the Hindu community was not dominant, as it did not have a unified sense of purpose, being divided by caste, language, and region. In 1946 Mohammad Ali Jinnah was more concerned to secure the grouping of provinces and the allocation of residual powers to these provinces. At this stage, legislative weight was not such a prominent issue and it did not feature in the CMP.

In the lower chamber, large differences in population size create large differences in representation, which are not conducive to the smooth operation of a federation given the potential for one large province to out-vote all others. In the upper chamber, the same problem occurs if provinces are represented according to population strength. Even if provinces are equally represented, this can lead to inequity if the small provinces out-vote the larger ones.

This is not necessarily the case. Federalism is maligned in South Africa because of its association with the apartheid “homelands” concept and for its role in “manufacturing identities.” Identities are situational, and language was temporarily subsumed under religion because of the success of the Muslim League’s mobilizing campaign. This did not mean that linguistic identities were unimportant. The campaign to secure Urdu as a means of instruction and of government service cannot be separated from the Muslim movement for autonomy/partition Although this did not include residual powers.


The failure of the Narasimha Rao Government in 1992 or the state Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government of Uttar Pradesh to prevent the destruction of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya. India’s federation was influenced by the Soviet system, and the Americans in the interests of regional security promoted the One Unit Plan of Pakistan. The Americans wanted a strong center for such an important buffer state. Reference was made in both Constituent Assemblies to existing federations. The Report of the Royal Commission on the Australian Constitution.

In Pakistan, a report was commissioned for the Constituent Assembly detailing the structures and institutions of other federations. This report discussed the general principles of federalism and produced an analysis of the division of power in the United States, Canada, Australia, and South Africa. This is not the same as saying that they wanted a Hindu-dominated state. It was the territorial concentration of the Muslim community that threatened the federal governing structure. Congress’s constitutional preferences, dictated by its notion of national identity.

This unity became strained in the wake of the economic crisis that affected East Pakistan after partition and “more than a million persons abandoned their homes before the year 1950 was out, though many returned after a measure of tranquility was restored”. The word translates to mean refugee and came to refer to the Muslims who migrated to urban Sindh from India. Many Muslims from East Punjab migrated to West Punjab but they were more easily absorbed because of the cultural similarities. This percentage rises and falls according to how Hindi speakers are classified.

For example, in the 1971 census, Bihari and Rajasthani speakers were conflated with Hindi speakers. Punjab was eventually reorganized in 1966 but not along religious lines. The reorganization did not create a particularly homogeneous province along linguistic lines and remains incomplete. Karachi was the capital city, the destination for many Urdu speakers from India after partition. Baluchistan was comprised of multiple tribal areas, but the States Union, with a majority of Baluchi speakers, was merged with “British” Baluchistan, of which 41 percent were Pashtu speakers. Baluchistan was the only province that was constituted anew. Pashtu speakers were deliberately included within its boundaries rather than adding them to the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP).

This undermined both Baluchi homogeneity and calls for a greater Pakhtoonkhwa. Despite the consultation, the League, the Congress, and the princes rejected the final Act. This did not stop the League and the Congress from contesting the elections of 1937 held under it, although the Congress demanded guarantees concerning the extent of provincial control that the elected governments would have before taking up office. The Act was renamed the 1947 Indian Independence Act.

This provision also applies to religious groups. Although schools receive financial assistance from the state, the state cannot compel religious instruction, and those that are wholly state-funded “cannot impart any religious instruction”. The Indian Constitution included reserved seats for Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST). However, this study does not concentrate on them. SCs, as a whole, does not constitute a separate ethnic group.

There is no one identity for an SC any more than there is for a Brahmin or a Kshatriya; they are regionally defined. There is a stronger case for including STs as a separate ethnic group. Tatu Vanhanen argues that STs are “the most clearly separate ethnic group in India”. At the most basic level, they can be subdivided into Adivasis and those racially distinct communities of the northeast of India.

The legislative weight in the 1956 Pakistani constitution overrepresented the Western Wing in the National Assembly to ensure parity with the demographically dominant Eastern Wing. As the Western Wing was linguistically heterogeneous, this did not amount to the recognition of linguistic identity in the decision-making institutions of the state. 29. They were massively underrepresented in the army and the bureaucracy and were denied the opportunity to form the government after the Awami League won a majority of seats in the 1970 national elections.


In FEDERALISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICT REGULATION IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN, Katharine Adeney shows that institutional structure is the most vital informative variable in understanding the distinctive force and kinds of conflicts in the two nations instead of the job of religion. Adeney inspects the degree to which past constitutional choices clarify current day clashes.
The practice of the two states, with reference to language and religion, doubts over the coherence of the strategies adopted to manage diversity. Nehru and Jinnah’s ideal strategies were tested by the etymological decent variety inside their states. Their readiness and capacity to adjust to these difficulties had ramifications for the security of the two organizations.

Nor pioneer’s verbalization of the national character, characterizing the authenticity of cases for acknowledgment by their assorted populaces, can be utilized to clarify completely the discriminatory settlement of various ethnic gatherings. Nehru at first allowed common dialects yet without a doubt, in all respects reluctantly did he perceive etymological self-administering rights through a semantic redesign. Nonetheless, his concurrent promise to manufacture all Indians into one country had as its conclusion, a desire to keep up India’s regional trustworthiness.

Recognizing their indigenous religious networks to recognize the regional institution has been clarified why combatants or audio-skim fighters are not equally compatible. Kashmir is referred to as accepting shaved and Punjabi-speaking states without the end of independence. Jinnah’s origination of an Islamic state with security for religious minorities was apparently a multicultural one yet moved toward becoming a segregationist in reality.
In spite of the sacred pecking order of religions inside Pakistan, Muslims in various areas were not suited similarly.

This prohibition was the aftereffect of two factors: The separation of the separatist Islamic role between the districts exposed the perspective of the imprisonment of nature of integration. On the occasion when the separation of the separation was linked to its predictions, it was a result of the struggle. The second factor was the consequence of the primary; Muslim character moved toward becoming less notable as Sindhi and Bengali personalities were undermined. Along these lines, the assembly of Muslims, which had prompted Pakistan’s creation, was not converted into a larger character.

Restricted multiculturalism changed into an instrument of segregationist control concerning the Bengalis and incorporation included an ethnic measurement inside the Western Wing.

Nehru and Jinnah’s comprehension of national personality remained basically the equivalent after autonomy. What neither pioneer at first recognized was the expanded remarkable quality of language somewhat in light of the fact that the diminished compelling number of religious gatherings made this characterless striking and made language all the more so. This moved the systems to oblige assorted variety.

Federal stability is difficult to quantify. In recent years, India has witnessed the extension of regional parties in which the observers have expressed concern over the stability of the state. But federal stability should not be balanced with the stability of the government.

Number analysis For parliamentary stability, political parties and types of types can be taken as proxy Increase the number of movements that describe the outside demands Constitutional framework, or boycott of specific elections because of them Concerns about the legitimacy of the process.

Although India, unlike Pakistan has not experienced a successful separation which she has deployed to the vast power concerning the reality of India’s “stability”, maintaining its integrity of regional integrity Pakistan has become more confused. Yet of India Population is far higher than Pakistan and much more religious and linguistically diverse. Using this measure, you will ignore it although the real success is that India has adjusted verbal identities This cannot be successful in adjusting the religious one.

These states have threat to the Indian federation because they have an alternative religious majority, though; the Indian federation has perceived that this is so. This perception has created a self-fulfilling prophecy. The state-sponsored national identity, under the guise of secularism, has provoked conflict within these states and between the states and the center.
The fact is that non-Hindu religious communities were concentrating in areas of the border The center, which, in its turn, expressed much interference in those states with the majority of Hindus. The result of instability was predictable.

Unlike India, Pakistan failed to maintain its territorial integrity with the secession of Bangladesh in 1971. The co-opiate and security of the groups are required to perform their work as a federal dispute rule for the Federal Republic. This should not be a democracy. Indeed, in democracy, especially in a short period, the community can crush the tension This is because democracy does not automatically recognize group rights, therefore, rather than a rigid representation groups need to feel that identities that matter to them (for example, the Sindhi language) is protected (segmental autonomy and the mutual veto) as well as having representatives with their interests at heart at the center.

Their representation need not be proportional, but it must be real and significant in the institutions, and the positions within those institutions, that matter. Co-option at a low level merely confirms a subordinate status. The importance of meaningful co-option has been demonstrated by the fact that the issues in NWFP are similar to those in Baluchistan and Sindh, relating to resource allocation between the provinces, the division of the proceeds of resources, and water allocation.

Katharine Adeney, clear lessons for federal designers in distributing ethics Society emerges. The most obvious is to focus on a certain extent Consular features are required for successful federal management. Federally supported communities can help promote societies and security for different communities, but they do not
Governments’ rule forms, as they can all easily. Regional regionally focuses on promoting security for ethnic groups, and the creation of harmony units can be very important to provide this security, but it can be the best without representation in the center.

The structure of ethnic diversity within a state, as well as the state, is one Democracy will influence whether a specific federal form will succeed in managing various types of successes, as will experience the experience of the previous organization.

Read More: The law of armed conflict


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